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Size is an important factor underlying variations in the international
behavior of nation-states; small states as a class tend to differ from large states in
their foreign policy behavior. (East 1973:556)
The truth probably is that the world community has not yet thought its way
through the phenomenon of very small states in the world that is emerging in the
end years of the twentieth century '" Can the world proceed any longer on the old
assumptions that underpinned the concept of the nation-state? (Harden 1985:5)
The end of the Cold War and the promise of a new world order has been met
with a collective sigh of relief by many Pacific Island leaders. For in improved
East-West relations they see the emergence of a new world order where they will
no longer be shackled to a world view shaped largely by the strategic perceptions
of other powers who have tended to view the islands, if not as stepping stones to
somewhere else, then as a possible venue for superpower confrontation. Indeed,
superpower rivalry was the prism through which the dominant ANZUS powers
have tended to view the region. Cold War rhetoric, and the various pressures
exerted by metropolitan powers on island leaders to conform to the 'central
balance', shaped the strategic perceptions of many. It also limited their
international choices. (Sanday 1991 :35)
There are several features of interest in these statements.
First, that the concept of security by its purely military definition
seems scarcely applicable anymore to the Pacific Islands. Second,
there is the clear implication that the fact of smallness inclines small
states towards a particular type of foreign policy with regard to the
international community. The depiction of the security of small
states, specifically Pacific Island nation-states, as resting primarily
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on external or indigenous 'security forces' is common practice among
analysts and policy-makers. The second belief, that smallness
produces particular foreign policy traits and security requirements
for small states, is also shared among analysts and policy-makers.
In a wider context, thel!9ternational ~lations literature on
small states is in need of some sorting out and comparative analysis.
This paper will try to show theoretically and empirically why the
concept of small state, as it has been employed in the past, cannot be
developed for theoretical purposes. Explanations for small state
foreign policy and security will be examined beyond the variable of
size to incorporate such other factors across different levels of
analysis as personality characteristics of individual decision-makers,
internal political structures, geopolitical environments, and issue
sensitivity. The theme unifying this work is that while the size of a
state can be used to describe an actor in international relations as
small, the concept of the small state lacks explanatory content and
theoretical utility.
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Definitional Difficulties in the Literature
How one looks at the world globally influences the importance
one attributes to particular places (Kirby 1987; Cohen 1990). Most of
the literature on foreign policy behavior is built around the actions,
interests and policies of the major powers (Pepper 1985; Gray 1988;
Sloan 1988). Yet by statistical definitions major powers are in the
minority. Statements which may be valid with respect to major
powers may have declining relevance for others. The United States
is as far removed from the 'average' c;:t~tp in tnnc;:t itnnnTt~ntU' _......... ••• • "u... .t'''' ..
dimensions as is Papua New Guinea; indeed statistically, P~a New
Guinea is much closer to the 'average' state. Internationall~~lations
literature may be power-centric, but it clearly is not state-centric
until such time as it puts the average state at the center of its
concerns.
The conventional approach towards small states is that they
are large states writ small: they pursue similar interests by similar
means, but with appropriate modifications to reflect their relatively
fewer resources and power disparities with major actors. An
alternative is to take as a point of departure the assumption that
small state behavior is qualitatively different, with its own
characteristic mode of functioning and techniques of statecraft. The
international states-system cannot be regarded as homogeneous, and
assuming the behavior patterns of the larger states to be
characteristic of all states ignores the very pronounced skewness III
distribution of the major variables differentiating states from one
another (e.g. military expenditure, number under arms, population,
contributions to United Nations budget, official development
assistance, GNP, and land area).
The literature on small states also suffers from another
weakness. This weakness is the hegemonic position of Anglo-
American scholarship in the field of Qnternational ~elations theory
(as noted by Holsti 1985). Representatives of this branch of
scholarship tend to approach the small state from the point of view
of smallness being a problem. The 'small state paradox' (Amstrup
1976:169) is one of viability: how, given smallness, have the small
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states survived and indeed proliferated? The assumption behind the
small state-as-a-problem approach, whether explicit or tacit, is that
of realism: in an anarchical world of power-maximizing actors (Bull
1977), how can the small state remain viable? Yet already the focus
has been broadened from a consideration simply of size. The
problem is now one of viability in a hostile environment with both a
structural element (international anarchy), and a characteristic
pattern of behavior (power maximization). Thus the theoretical
notion of environment has been introduced, and the problem has
hp:p:n tr::ln..:formp:n into onp: of nnit nnnntntinn to ltll pnvlTonmpnt___ ........... -.., ... _ ............__ ........__A.a."" _ ... _ ........ y .. _ .... ""w .. ... " .... u "'.......... " ........."' ......
Viability now becomes a function of adaptive skills of a given unit
within its particular environment.
This in turn leads to a another difficulty for students interested
in examining South Pacific foreign policies as examples of small state
behavior. Some of the best theoretical and empirical work on small
states has been done by Europeans and/or on European small states,
in particular Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries
(Vital 1967 & 1971). Yet the historical and environmental
differences between Europe and the Pacific are so profound that, on
the face of it, the applicability of 'Euro-derived' propositions to the
Pacific Island nation-states seems to be suspect. (The mean GNP and
population of 25 European countries is $230.1 billion and 30.8
million; of the fifteen members of the South Pacific Forum, 1.3 billion
and 1.7 million.) The historical experience of the European small
states is that their security is a function of the balance of power
among the European great powers, a phenomenon that is largely
irrelevant to the Pacific Island nation-states. The European states
also have a much longer history as independent states; Pacific Island
nation-states have only just recently assumed responsibility for the
conduct of their foreign affairs, as the hierarchical structure of
imperial authority has fragmented into the fully developed states-
system.
The European small states are part of the European mainstream
in political culture and race; the Pacific include a considerable
diversity of political traditions among Micronesian, Melanesian,
Polynesian and European peoples. Some of the Pacific Island nation-
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states are former colonies, and present security wards, of Australia,
New Zealand and the United States; no European small state faces this
peculiar relationship with another European country. The unit of
Pacific Islands international relations is 'microstatic', resource poor,
with a simple economy, and restricted educational and employment
opportunities; this combination creates a particular problem of
emigration for employment and study. The European states occupy a
frontier or buffer position in the strategic environment of the
~ tv.>
superpowers; the Pacific Islands A far removed from the theaters of
~l1nprpOUlPT f'"onfl1f'"t ~~ nO~~lhlp ron thiC' p<>rth
uo_yY.a. '"' ...... "".a. __ .............._ ........U' Y,",IJU.L...,.L_ VA .. " ...... u _"".........
causal and a facilitative influence on the distinctive international
roles played by the European small states in the tertiary sector of
international relations (international peacekeeping, negotiation and
conference venues, etc.).
A final difficulty for students of small state behavior is that the
existing literature is overly concerned with the independent variable
of smallness, to the neglect of the dependent variable of the behavior
of small states. Yet even with regard to the independent variable,
there is no consensus among theorist on the conceptual meaning of
smallness or on how to operationalize a small state. The scales of
magnitude employed to determine 'smallness' or 'bigness' will always
seem arbitrary. Most use population as the determining criterion,
but the ceiling of a small state ranges from 500,000 to 25 million
(Henderson 1984:254-253). Nor do different dimensions of size
correlate very well: nations are notably rank-disequiliberated
(ranking high on some dimensions and low on others). No
satisfactory or generally accepted formula exists for aggregating the
several dimensions of statehood into one conceptual whole.
Because size, like power, is relational, it becomes a comparative
rather than an absolute criterion; it becomes in part a perceptual
phenomenon too, not simply an objective one. Smallness is a
psychological criterion also in the sense that decision-makers can use
it as a legitimating argument for a policy that they favor. Not
surprisingly, the theme of Pacific Island nation-states as small states
recurs in the literature, although not with any degree of rigor or
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sophistication in regard to conceptual definition or theoretical
propositions.
'Small' can easily be confused with 'weak', especially if the
concept is analyzed from the perspective of traditional power theory
(Rothstein 1977). But this makes propositions about small-state
behavior redundant. Large states can also be weak, due to internal
factors such as weak institutional structure, lack of a strong sense of
nationhood, the existence of unassimilated ethnic minorities, or
poorly defined borders. This can be seen in the Soviet Union of
large state and brought about its demise. Conversely, a very small
state with widely shared values among its people, firmly based
institutions, and long recognized borders, can be viewed as a
powerful state. Switzerland is often cited as a small state where
many of these factors make it powerful (Handel 1981). It is also
worth recalling that the small state was the 'normal' state until the
mid-19th century -- the norm changed with the unification of
Germany and Italy and the increased size and power of older
European nation-states. (England and France were exceptions.)
Today's normative definition posits the state as one 'large enough to
generate substantial economic and political self-sufficiency and to
sustain a serious national purpose' (Lowenthal 1987:28).
So essentially any statement about size-based behavior of
small states could be refuted with at least one contrary empirical
example. General propositions about small states could be rescued
only with recourse to qualifications, modifications and auxiliary and
ad hoc hypotheses. But this in turn would make a theory of small
states cumbersome, with to many variables, and restrictive in its
applicability tt particular cases. It can be argued that this is the
opposite of f good theory, which aims to be 'parsimonious, elegant
and comprehensive' (Rosenau 1966)
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The Pacific Islands Security Problem?
It is not difficult to identify the moment when the VIew of
small states being a problem within the international states-system
achieved a prominent position in world affairs. In October 1983, the
island of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean was invaded by armed
forces of the United States. The action constituted the world's first
military invasion of a small island state. Grenada was an island with
a mere 110,000 inhabitants, whose best known export was nutmeg:
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imperative to invade. The whole episode to many presented a new
dimension to the international states-system. Now scholars and
policy-makers saw small island states as a new challenge to the game
of international power-politics of larger states.
The logic of the new thinking about small states was reinforced
,by the alread;\ established assumptions about such states in the
(Jnternational cielations literature as being particularly vulnerable,
dependent, and resourceless (Benedict 1967; Selwyn 1975; Connell
1988). These economic characteristics were linked to an assumed
security characteristic -- a lack of resources to deal with security
threats of even a minor nature (Wolfers 1962). It was further
assumed that this combination makes these countries particularly
vulnerable to the actions of outside interest seeking to manipulate
internal politics (Maniruzzman 1982:72-75). The conclusion is that
the possible instability flowing from this situation could significantly
affect regional security and even 'the central balance' (Quester
1983: 160-175). In its most dramatic form the new thinking
portrayed microstates simply as 'dangerous' (Harden 1985); in its
more moderate form as particularly prone to instability. This was
the first time that small states as a group had been given a security
personality or regarded as a security category (Espindola 1987). The
model was clearly one suggested by the Grenada experience. This
experience was generalized to include all small island states whether
in the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean or the Pacific.
The new thinking not only characterized the potential security
problems posed by small states; it also considered the need for
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management of those problems. The management was to be carried
out by those larger powers which had the security resources
required to assist but would be done under the auspices and with the
cooperation of small states themselves, organized regionallY!"".' Again
it was the Grenada model writ large. The new thinking was
particularly evident in Commonwealth circles and was proliferating
throughout the academic security literature (Diggines 1986:191-205).
It had a direct and immediate impact on Pacific Island nation-states
because the Commonwealth Secretariat organized a security
('o]JO{lnlnm ln l~tp 1Q~L1 ~I: n~Tt of itl: TP"iPUT rtf thp I:Pf'HTlt" nTrthlprn~w_ -'1- _ _ ..v .&oJ_. _1l.,7 1"'-"'''' "'.&. U' _ y" "'.&. - rr.7 __ u. J .t'.L"'v _a ~
of small states (Blacker 1985). This was the first time that Pacific
Island nation-states had ever specifically addressed security
questions. While the participants resisted any move towards
security arrangements involving intervention in internal affairs, it
was nevertheless an important occasion. It began the process of
consideration of regional 'stability' and security by small states.
The more important impact of the new thinking, especially in
terms of increasing the foundation for possible future collective
intervention in internal security matters, was in Western capitals.
Arguably, the more distant the capital the more appealing the new
generalizations about small state security (Siaguru 1989:160-169).
For such policy-makers, small states became a priority security
problem. The bottom line was that they were a problem that needed
management if they were not to upset 'the central balance', or more
particularly, Western interests. These new attitudes could
predispose outside actors to see a region of potential crisis and to see
a necessity for management strategies. These strategies ranged from
exploiting small states dependency status (Firth 1989), to
incrementally redefining sovereignty (Herr 1988), to outright great
power intervention (Alford 1984).
The emergence of this new thinking about small state security
in general coincided with a number of particular developments in the
Pacific which seemed at least to Western security analysts, to
confirm the 'small is dangerous' thesis. These developments began in
1984 with the troubles in New Caledonia following the boycott of the
Assembly elections by the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et
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Socialiste. More important in terms of Western perceptions of an
emergent regional instability, however, was what followed in 1985-
86: the Soviet fishing agreement with Kiribati; the Soviet offer of
fishing agreements to other island governments, which was taken up
by Vanuatu; Gorbachev's Vladivostock speech; the Soviet naval
buildup in the North Pacific; and the Libyan connection with groups
and individuals in New Caledonia and Vanuatu. These developments
were seen as constituting Soviet and Libyan threats to regional
security (Tanham 1988).
Viewed against the backdrop of the ANZUS crisis of 1984-1985,
the dominant outside perception quickly became one of a region that
posed a potential security problem for the first time since the Second
World War. The problem was seen to be externally-generated: a
combination of Soviet opportunism, Libyan meddling, and the ANZUS
crisis. The island states themselves were viewed as manipulable and
1J_.VU,lfl.i'!~~~:~l~ns in a great-power game (Sutherland 1988:123).
f;-'t IdlJv"'~v::. r'J .C\~'( ~bthe 'security problemi (ro~II"--l.....,tF"J;h""e:-Lpr;;a:;:;-c'ific Islanders
p~ though) is entirely different. The decolonization of the
Pacific Islands began in 1962 with the independence of Western
Samoa from New Zealand. The next twenty-five years saw the
emergence of nine independent sovereign states, and four states that
are self-governing in 'association' with their former administering
powers. In general, the Pacific Islands escaped the violent transition
that occurred in Africa. The colonial inheritance in the Pacific was
far less combustible than elsewhere. Until the Fiji military couPE in
May 1987, the record of political stability in the new states of the
Pacific region had been good. There was little political conflict and
disorder, no impositions of one-party rule and no unilateral changes
to the constitution to entrench a particular leadership in power
(Zolberg 1968).
In contrast, Pacific Island nation-state governments have been
changed regularly and in constitutional fashion. There has been only
one extra-constitutional group which overthrew a government.
Elsewhere in the region, most dissent and opposition occurred within
the political framework, and the delivery of government services and
the performance of governments generally has been reasonably
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efficient. The transItIOn of independence in all states but with the
important exception of Vanuatu in 1980 (where a condominium
colonial structure and an obstructionist French administration ruined
the process), has been handled relatively smoothly. Subsequently,
there have been few recriminations between new island states and
former colonial powers.
The Fiji coupf which saw Lt. Colonel Rabuka overthrow the
II
democratically elected coalition government of the Fiji Labor Party
and the Indo-Fijian backed National Federation Party, has dented the
~nJJth P~,...jf.j,..l(" r""nJ1t~tlnn fnr ('t~hl11t" {~~ffJ1 10QO\ ill•••h.,.·1.p: t...h.p:
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determinants of Lt. Colonel Rabuka's action was country-specific, it
was unfortunately viewed by many as an indicator of the entire
region's 'security problems'. Even though the country has attempted
to internally resolve the dissent and opposition within its own
cultural parameters, security analysts and policy-makers outside the
region used the coup to highlight, in a extreme way, the perceived
political turbulence and instability in the region (Robertson 1988).
Recently, in Papua New Guinea, the violence and the threat of
succession on the copper-rich North Solomons (Bougainville) Province
has been used to reinforce the prevailing views of the region, and
small island states inherent instability (Hegarty 1989).
But these instances of readjustment of the artificially imposed
political community in some Pacific Island nation-states are not
confined to small states (Mendlowitz 1990). Imposed boundaries
and geographically defined political communities are changing the
world over. Is not then the whole international political community
insecure? Of course there is considerable debate on this issue and
not the focus of this paper. But it should be pointed out that in fact
the Pacific Island region still enjoys a great deal of stability
(Chaudery 1988: 31-39).
In fact, Pacific Islanders are defining their own regional post-
Cold War security agenda in order to maintain that stability. The
Pacific Island nation-states have adopted three important regional
treaties that assert their independence on indigenous matters of
concern: the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of
Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States
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III 1987; the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources
and Environment of the South Pacific Region in 1968, and; the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) in 1985 (I.L.M.
1987 & New Zealand 1986). Outside analysts and policy-makers are
realizing that these treaties coupled with other foreign policy
initiatives have essentially transformed these 'microstates' into
'macro-ocean nations' (Cicin-Sain 1989:39).
These treaties, combined with other foreign policy initiatives
by Pacific Islanders, have pressed the larger powers to become more
relationship to traditional notions of military security (Siaguru
1989: 19). The Pacific Islanders are frustrated at the attempts by the
larger powers to derail the implementation of their own version of a
'security paradigm' upon which the energies of intraregional and
extraregional actors should be focused. Pacific Islanders want to
create an environment in which great powers recognize and fully
respect the sovereign rights of each Pacific Island nation-state.
Kiribati President Ieremia Tabai summarized Pacific Island security
objectives in succinct terms: "What we want at the end of the day is
basically what more developed countries want for their people: a
happier and healthier life that in the long term can be sustained
from our own resources (Tow 1988:186)."
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Security, Small States and the Pacific Islands
There seems to be a common assumption that a major power
seeks to fashion a new international environment in its own image; a
regional power aspires to create a favorable regional environment; a
minor power is restricted to the concern to preserve territorial
integrity and political independence. Yet loss of actor control over
the environment has occurred for all states in modern society (Morse
1976:87), and the relative power of participants moves in the
direction of equalization in an interdependent system (Holl
1983 :291). In today's interdependent world, no state, not even the
most powerful, is able to function entirely independent from some
external influence or constraint. What is happening today is that the
international system has become more globally linked, regionally and
sectorially. This results in small states becoming more integrated
into the global system. This integration will create an environment
of mutual reliance between large and small states (Dalby 1991 :37).
Major powers tend to identify the world order with their own
national security interest (Kratochwil 1989:119-141). One of the
reasons for increased questioning of the present security structure
for the Pacific Islands is the realization that the smaller states can
differ in their definitions of the threat and in their choice of
appropriate responses to contain and defuse the threat. The smaller
states are also more likely to have a broader conception of security,
stressing economic and normative interests as well as military
threats (King 1991 :45-64). One study showed that in responding to
crises, 'great powers and superpowers were more prone to military
responses while the weaker states tended toward non-violent
behavior' (Wilkenfeld 1988: 199), which supports an earlier study
that major powers have engaged in conflict behavior to a greater
extent than small states (Rummell 1979).
Nevertheless, the securi~..t~cerns of small states are
qualitatively different from ...that of large states. Small states worry
about economic viability and sovereignty, whereas larger states view
security primarily as military prowess and capability. In the pre-
nuclear age, smaller states could seek to dissuade attacks from major
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powers by developing the capability to impose costs upon the major
power that would exceed any anticipated gains. One of the by-
products of the nuclear age has been to render defense by smaller
states against nuclear attack, which can be kept militarily cost-free
to the aggressor, physically impossible. Deterrence of nuclear
weapon use in relations between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon
states results from costs of the international normative system. The
risk of nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state is virtually eliminated,
and of conventional attack and invasion is considerably diluted in the
nre"!ll11no nnrrn~ nf thp 1 OSl()~ !Inri l1kph1 tn rprn!lln lnul lnt thp1".1.. ... '4..............0 ...... "" ........u "". "'............ .&../ v,""u, .... .1..1."'" ...... """"' .... J LV ... v ............ .I..I. LV Y.. ... .... '" .. v
foreseeable future. Where international society was once a
consequence of the success and survival of states, today it is a
condition (Jackson & Rosberg 1982:1-24).
Geographic location and size significantly contribute to the
security of Pacific Island nation-state. According to the assessments
of both New Zealand's and Australia's 1987 White Papers on Defence,
'the Australasian security environment is exceptionally benign'
(Thakur 1987:890-897). It has been suggested that small island
states show a tendency to concentrate their security forces on
coastguard duties, giving first priority to the control of their
exclusive economic zones and the prevention of drug trafficking and
smuggling (Espindola 1987:73). This is very true of most Pacific
Island nation-states whose largest military investment is in the
Pacific Patrol Boats. (The boats in fact are heavily subsidized by
Australia.) Other than being used for disaster and emergency relief,
the boats primary function and role is enforcement of the island's
exclusive economic zone. In addition, maintenance of a small armed
force, or a police force can serve the symbolic purpose of expressing
national identity. Indeed, it could be suggested that some Pacific
Island nation-states are creating a distinct national identity by
limiting costly armed forces and pursuing the role of unarmed honest
broker in international affairs.
Size and strategic location are also a significant contribution
towards explaining the Pacific Islanders crusade against nuclearism.
The Pacific Island nation-states must occupy one of the most secure
geopolitical environments in the world. Their size precludes the
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development of an offensive military capacity of their own (Quester
1983; Alford 1984). But along with geographic location, size also
precludes the development of an adequate defensive capability
against all imaginable contingencies.
For most of their short history, this has led the Pacific Island
nation-states to favor seeking the protection of a large and powerful
friend: Australia primarily, but also the US and New Zealand (Herr
1986:16-22). But as the contingency of a direct invasion of the
Pacific Island nation-states has become ever more remote, while the
nuclear arsenals have continued to gro\v unchecked; as the strategies
of deterrence began to sit uneasily alongside talks of winning or
prevailing in a nuclear war; as scenarios of nuclear winter unfolded
with their bleak messages for noncombatants far from nuclear
theaters: the Pacific Islanders woke to the realization that the
gravest and the most probable threat to their security lay in the
risks of a breakdown in the nuclear peace (Hamel-Green 1991:59-
84). Anything which the Pacific Islanders could do to ameliorate the
risks was therefore the most direct contribution to their national
security, not just idealistic thoughts divorced from calculations of
national interest. Although the Treaty of Rarotonga may not
eliminate all nuclear potential from the South Pacific, it does make a
contribution to an increasing global push for denuclearization.
Three clusters of socio-cultural traits have been identified for
small insular states: conservatism and tradition; managed intimacy;
and a pervasive concern with autonomy (Lowenthal 1987). The
intimacy fostered by the 'multiplex society of a small state' produces
a sense of community which visitors find such an 'enchanting step
back in time.' This has a triple potential relevance for the Pacific
Island nation-states foreign policy. First, the tightness of community
enables political participation and sense of civic efficacy which may
help to explain the success of the campaign for a Nuclear Free and
Independent Pacific. Second, the smallness of Pacific Island
countries has encouraged 'informal, somewhat domesticated
relationships' in the Pacific regional setting (Boyce & Herr 1974:35).
Third, small communities need to manage intimacy in order to
dampen the risk of splits resulting in the destruction of society. That
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is, the US by virtue of its large size can afford to engage in fractious
politics constantly; the Pacific Island nation-states are more likely to
search for political and social mechanisms of accommodation ('the
Pacific Way').
Thus, the case of the Pacific Island nation-states anti-nuclear
policies suggests that a fusion of regional security [as in the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Thakur 1987)] and general
international security (for example in a Comprehensive Test Ban
treaty), which recognizes common security and so dispenses with a
states than with larger ones. The nuclear revolution has 'highlighted
the bankruptcy of the traditional approach to security as a zero sum
game' (Hoffman 1988:9). National security provides the ideological
underpinning of a system of states which is not capable any longer of
guaranteeing either external security or internal welfare: peace and
prosperity are increasingly dependent upon the interplay of
exogenous variables. Much as nuclear weapons have drawn the fate
of all peoples into their ever-widening ambits, with increasingly
integrated relations of destruction and theories of nuclear exchange,
so an expanding world economy has begun to make the daily
economic activities of peoples around the world dependent upon
increasingly integrated relations of production and patterns of
exchange (Dalby 1991).
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Alliances, Small States and the Pacific Islands
The 1938 Munich lesson of the unreliability of the security
guarantee can lead to contradictory policy implications for smaller
allies. In the Pacific Islands, there are many who view the ANZUS
(Australia-New Zealand-United States Treaty) security umbrella as
unreliable, then the premium imposed by being under that security
umbrella (allowing nuclear activities to occur within the region) is a
needless expense. From a theoretical point of view, the Pacific
Islanders greatest interest lies in the fact that both supporters and
opponents of being under the ANZUS umbrella frame their
arguments in terms of the benefits or risks to the smaller states.
Thus the pro-umbrella constituency is very much in line with the
realist belief that small states security is a function of balance of
power in the international states-system, and its policy ought to be
to contribute to that security. A secondary -- but to some a primary
-- theme is that for a small states like Pacific Island nation-states,
resource constraints deny the possibility of developing a modern
well-trained and well-equipped armed force of its own; the United
States military link was most useful in solving the cost constraints of
providing sufficient military capabilities. Opponents of the ANZUS
umbrella base their case on the assumption that in a structural
condition of multipolar disequilibrium, smaller states can best
contribute to peace by easing tensions from outside the power
struggles. Yet in a tense multipolar system, bloc leaders are likely to
be less tolerant of independent-minded allies, while smaller partners
may perceive the potentially destabilizing ricks of independent
postures as exceeding the anticipated benefits.
The Pacific Island debate on the ANZUS umbrella suggests that
neutrality is another possibility. The experiences of the two world
wars indicate that neither alliances nor neutrality, with variant
associated policies, can guarantee a small state against involvement
in a larger-power war. Neutrality led to the disappearance for forty-
five years of Lithuania; attack, occupation and restoration of Norway;
attack without occupation of Finland; and non-belligerency of
Sweden. Among other small and medium states that had chosen
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alliance, Albania was engulfed by its protector Italy, Czechoslovakia
abandoned by its guarantor France, and Poland guaranteed only to
be abandoned by Britain (Rothstein 1977: 117). Given the empirical
evidence throughout human history concerning alliance behavior, it
seems likely that the formulation of a national security doctrine
underpins a choice made by personality characteristics of decision-
makers as much as size, structural and geopolitical calculations.
In the coming years, for Pacific Island nation-states, as indeed
for many other small states in comparable circumstances, a major
between national security policies and the international order.
Should they be aligned, semi-aligned, dealigned, non-aligned, or
neutral?
There is no general theory of alliances that can explain the
circumstances in which nations choose to be aligned, with whom, and
for how long (Stein 1990). Nor is there a consensus in the literature
on the merits of states aligning with larger protectors. Machiavelli
believed that by choosing to remain neutral, a small state risked the
enmity of larger powers while forfeiting a share in spoils of war.
Furthermore, "the one who is not friendly will seek your neutrality,
and he who is friendly to you will ask that you declare yourself with
arms." Nevertheless his advice was that a prince must "never
associate with someone more powerful than himself so as to attack
others, except when necessity presses (Machiavelli 1985:89-90)."
The Correlates of War project concluded that "smaller nations
without alliance ties tend to be aggressed upon more often (Jensen
1982:225)." Lack of alignment is a feasible strategy if the small state
concerned is strategically irrelevant (that is, the central balance of
power is insensitive to its alignment stance) and politically non-
provocative (Rothstein 1977:33). Yet small state alignment with
more powerful states can be globally destabilizing when the lesser
powers 'accentuate existing power' imbalances by choosing to side
with the stronger group of major powers (Fox 1979:187). One
analyst has attempted to explain this apparent paradox of small
states accentuating existing imbalances of power by suggesting that
they join coalitions against imbalances of threat (Walt 1987). While
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balance of power theory is constructed on the distribution of
capabilities (population, economic capacity, military force), the
balance of threat is constructed on the distribution of threats
(capabilities, proximity, offensive power, and intentions).
But consider for example the so-called 'lesson of Munich.'
Appeasement, according to conventional wisdom, only whets the
appetite of would-be aggressors. But this lesson is peculiar to the
major powers. From the point of view of smaller allies, the lessons of
1938 are different if equally important: major powers will
sometimes sacrifice the interests of their wards at the altar of one
another's expansionist ambitions rather than risk war if their own
interests are not directly engaged. The policy lesson for small states
IS therefore quite different, namely not to put all their security eggs
in the basket of an alliance with major powers.
One could seek to explain the Pacific Island nation-states
movement away from the umbrella of security provided by ANZUS,
by arguing that new perceptions of threat have changed from
previous perceptions of a potentially remilitarized Japan in the first
instance, and from an expansionist and monolithic Soviet communist
bloc in the second instance. The Pacific Islanders motivation was not
to tilt the imbalance of power in the Western favor even further, but
to redress the imbalance of threats to security in the Pacific (Dihm
1989:10-18). Japan is no longer regarded as a security risk and
perceptions of a fragmenting Soviet Union are more benign. (This
observation may have already become dated?) With no imbalance of
threats to redress -- or alternatively, with the balance of probabilities
suggesting that the only grave threat to Pacific Islanders security lies
in the possible breakdown of the nuclear peace -- the Pacific
Islanders are more sanguine about the necessities of the alliance
umbrella (Thakur 1989:929-934).
Pacific Island nation-states are in some ways natural allies, with
culture, traditions and language sharing the theme of 'the Pacific
Way', but that to outsiders, all this may appear to be quite alien. The
postwar ANZUS umbrella primarily assumed by the United States was
not a product of any kind of kinship ties or socio-political affinity
with the United States, but found some basis' in the geographical
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isolation and historical trauma of the events of the Second World War.
The ANZUS umbrella attempted to play up the notion on an insecure
environment in the region, and eventually ingrain fears of
vulnerability to some 'other threat.' The ANZUS umbrella was not
provided as a result of some benevolent concern towards small states.
Once the Pacific Island nation-states were included under the ANZUS
umbrella, the United States began to calculate how best the small
island states could contribute to the interests of the United States In
order to retain the goodwill of the alliance leader. The status of
smallness \I/aS an ex post facto justification for policies that took
advantage of a particular people and leadership at a given time. The
times have changed, the generations have changed, the leaders have
changed, and so have perceptions of the world and national security
interests (Jensen 1982:223).
This leads to another consideration. Smaller states ally with a
major power either in the belief that the risk to independence from
the protector itself is greater in an unaligned posture (that is, a
hegemon is better appeased than irked), or because they fear the
predatory designs of another major power. From a Pacific Islanders
point of view, on balance, Australia and the US are similarly powerful
in their relations with the Pacific Island nation-states, and
comparable in their abilities to inflict conscious or unintended
damage upon Pacific Island nation-states interests. However, in its
relations with Australia, the US, and to a lessor extent New Zealand,
the Pacific Island nation-states can also utilize the power of black
mail or 'reverse potentiality' of the weak, as indeed they have done.
In an asymmetric relationship, the weaker can call the tune by
threatening to collapse unless supported by the protector; the
stronger has no answering threat to return (Rothstein 1959: 119)
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Economics, Small States and the Pacific Islands
Under normal circumstances, the security problem can take an
economic form for a small state much more readily than physical
attack or conquest. Lack of a home market large enough to sustain
self-sufficient economic growth leading to dependence on foreign
markets is a problem common to small states. If for many realists
foreign policy is national security policy, for Pacific Island nation-
states it could be suggested that foreign policy is trade policy. For
economic reasons, too, a small state will emphasize foreign over
defense policy, and take recourse to foreign policy to make the
international and regional environment as benign as possible.
(Harden 1985).
There are three aspects to the relationship between the
international economic system and its smaller members: external
economic dependence, external sensitivity and foreign penetration.
The first is measured by export or total trade as a proportion of GNP.
Sensitivity, indicated by instability of export revenues, refers to the
lack of frontier control against environmental disturbances which
generate internal instabilities. Foreign penetration describes a
situation where the effectiveness of national policy instruments to
control outcomes has been significantly reduced under pressure from
outside influences (Vogel 1983:54-68).
Dependence, sensitivity and penetration are not entirely
structurally determined. One volitional strategy to reduce external
sensitivity is concentrating on foreign economic policy to the neglect
of other foreign policy issues. The involvement of economic
bureaucracies and the utilization of economic techniques of statecraft
have found to be three times more frequent in the foreign policy of
small states than in that of large states (East 1973:574). This is
combined with managerial bargaining patterns in the decision-
making process between the government and export-oriented groups
in the private sector (Vogel 1983:62) Thus, in a number of Pacific
Island nation-states their exist several public bodies engaged in
trade promotion activities, such as the various producer boards and
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export marketing authorities, which among other things resolve
divergent interests in foreign economic policy affairs.
The trade policies of the smaller countries cannot realistically
be isolated from international finance and monetary policy, and the
behavior of their export prices is largely a function of international
supply and demand factors. Exports of primary products in
particular -- still the staple Pacific Island nation-state export --
fluctuates cyclically in response to exogenous determinants. The
debt crisis, the global recession and global stock market instability
nation-state. Structural changes in the world economy and
intensifying inter-dependence, not just between countries, but
economic sectors as well, have brought about a convergence of
interests for such 'rival' multilateral organizations as GATT and
UNCTAD. This is best exemplified for Fiji in the Cairns Group of
agricultural free traders formed in August 1986, whose composition
bridges the old world/new world, East/West, and North/South
divides (Kakazu 1986).
In addition to the market dependency of the preceding
paragraph, there is also economic power dependency wherein a
state's economy is conditioned by the decision-making power of
individuals or firms in capitalist centers. Pacific Island nation-states
are asymmetrically dependent on the core in commerce, finance and
technology (Connell 1991). They have to learn to cope with an
international economic environment in which the old rules of the
game appear to be changing; there is rapid and radical deregulation
of financial markets all around the world; national economies are
increasingly internationalized; and the international production
structure approximates the global factory ever more closely with
decentralized production but centralized control and management.
In such an environment, small states like the Pacific Islands are
attempting to secure a product or service niche, e.g. foreign vessel
registry or offshore banking, as strategies of adaptation and survival.
Relative smallness does confer at least one important
advantage. Smaller players can get away with behavior which if
reproduced by the major actors would wreck any collective system
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of exchange; that is, as in alliances, smaller states can to some extent
treat the benefits of the system as a public good and enjoy a 'free
ride' (Selwyn 1975). An example of this is how transportation for
the Pacific Islands interstate commerce was in essence subsidized for
years by their geographical location in the trans-oceanic trade route
between continents.
Small states have small home markets, narrow band of
resources, and limited opportunities for diversified economies. They
therefore concentrate efforts on specializing in a limited range of
products and attempt to satisf)' consumption demands of their own
citizens through imports, which in turn must be paid through
exports. Consequently, smaller states are said to be relatively more
dependent on foreign trade than large states. The economic
constraints on the supply side concern land, labor capital and
entrepreneurship, and on the demand side, limited and narrow
domestic market, and 'a limited export-cum-diverse import external
market' (Ward 1975).
Not only is the small-state economy said to be excessively
dependent on foreign trade, with its own rate of growth a function of
the rate of growth of exports of goods and services; in addition, the
fact of narrow export items and diverse import goods takes away
capacity to exert influence over price and quotas in international
markets. But frontier protection of national economies is simpler
through a more easily manipulable customs regime, and therefore
import-substitution policies are more tempting. Nevertheless, a
small domestic market imposes severe limits on the scope of import
substitution, and so constricts the process of balanced growth
through export stimulation and import substitution. Small states
have a higher degree of concentration in the commodity composition
of exports and a broader expanse in the manufactured composition of
imports. That is, small states specialize in exports but generalize In
imports. (Demas 1976).
Size of a country may shape, but does not necessarily
determine trade ratios, commodity and geographic concentration of
exports. Size as an explanatory factor in isolation would be unable to
cope with the different responses Denmark ans Norway to European
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Community membership. The significance of size may be
subordinate to historical legacies, location, market access, currency
values, labor productivity, and other factors, even though smaller
states are clearly more vulnerable and exposed to shifts in
international economic equations, and so may face greater difficulties
in implementing the right policy mIX for the achievement of multiple
objectives (e.g. economic growth and balance of payments stability)
(Lloyd 1968).
Structure constrains, power enables; does small size denote
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as the ability to shape the operating environment of other actors, has
been held to be the key to understanding outcomes (Strange 1988).
Small states can be said to possess the most constrained opportunity
sets. But while the environment defines the context of state
behavior, how a state actually copes with its environment is not
determined by the latter.
The need to have predictable concessional resources and
assured markets has led many small states to seek and maintain
economic cooperation arrangements with larger states. The larger
states themselves may have strategic and commercial interests in
such arrangements. Such bilateral or regional arrangements have
significant importance to the development of small states (Fairbairn
1985:241-254). The South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic
Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), is an example of such an an
arrangement. In establishing SPARTECA, Pacific Island nation-states
attempted to try and increase their trading opportunities within
regional and international constraints, and to stabilize part of their
trading environment. For the island nation-states, SPARTECA was an
effort to reduce environmental uncertainty.
It has been argued that the international economic system is
characterized by rapid and far-reaching restructuring which has
increased the national vulnerability of a large number of small
countries (Hveem 1987:193-208). (Vulnerability refers to costs
incurred even after attempted adaptation to environmental changes
which are either systemic, or policy changes in the actions or other
actors in the system.) Small states are more affected by economic-
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systemic variables than large states are (Jensen 1982:262). The
postwar free trade order is held to have been dependent on United
States hegemony, with the United States being very influential in the
creation, operation and maintenance of the system. It has been
suggested that because the system was dependent upon one
economic power assuming the cost of governing it, it broke down as
the United States lost its hegemonic position under challenge from
the European Economic Community and Japan (Gilpin 1981). But it is
by no means clear that the relative military and financial powers of
the United States have declined alongside its market power (Russett
1985:207-282). The United States accounts for more than one-fifth
of global military expenditures and economic product, and is likely to
remain the most powerful state in the world for some time yet (Nye
1988: 105-129). An alternative argument asserts that the system
was intentionally one of conditional free trade or 'embedded
liberalism' (Ruggie 1982:379-415). In any case, a less predictable
international economic environment means less market access and
more competition for market shares for Pacific Island nation-states,
and surplus capacity in their agricultural export items.
The interdependence perspective offers the possibility of
cooperative strategies through integration or policy coordination,
although this is not easy if states are unequally vulnerable, and
unequally capable of coping with vulnerability. Increasing and more
complex (because of more actors, issues and interactions) economic
interdependence in the age of an integrated world economy has put
domestic social and economic policies at the mercy of external forces.
For the smaller states in the existing international order built upon
unstoppable nuclear weapons and penetrated national economies,
sovereignty has been reduced to mean the authority to choose how
best to cope with the outside penetrations, opportunities and
constraints. The recognition of the multilateral nature of the
SPARTECA agreement reflected a wider reality that long-term
mutuality of interests in conditions of economic interdependence
need to be insulated from disruptive temptations to engage in short-
term zero sum games that exploit uneven economic and social
distributions.
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SPARTECA also illustrates some of the interesting ways in
which the business of international relations has changed in recent
decades. In the classical interstate system, foreign policy used to
consist of the high politics of security and national interests. In
today's world of complex and multi-dimensional interdependence,
foreign policy for the smaller states is as likely to be grappling with
the low politics of equal access to materials and reciprocity of trade
concessions. As a corollary, where orthodox diplomacy emphasized
secretiveness and manipulation, contemporary diplomacy is often an
extension of national decision-making processes into the
international arena in order to cope with political and economic
problems that refuse to respect national frontiers. Negotiation
therefore between countries of the Pacific have moved away from
classical diplomacy to resemble instead the art of managing growing
bureaucracies (Vogel 1983).
Opposition to SPARTECA was expressed in the form of an
argument that integration with Australia and New Zealand would
merely entrench Pacific Island nation-states more firmly than ever
into a structurally subordinate position within the world economy.
The counter to this argument is that given the reality of external
economic dependence, sectoral diversification of dependence is a
sensible mode of adaptation. Whether agreements such as
SPARTECA fully protect the interest of small states without
compromising their security and their regional and wider economic
interests is left to further study.
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Diplomacy, Small States and the Pacific Islands
Constraints on the international behavior of small states are
less pronounced in the political-diplomatic sphere than in the
military and economic. There is a correspondingly larger universe of
small state foreign political behavior available for systematic
analysis. Governments of small countries, it has been hypothesized,
tend to be risk-avoiders (Selwyn 1975:8-24); but another study
found small states to engage in high-risk behavior (East 1973). The
scope for foreign policy to be influenced by belief systems of political
leaders is said to be greater in small states than large ones (Mulhall
1986:11-15). Bureaucratic points of resistance to policy
modifications or policy overhauls are neither as numerous nor as
formidable. Small states engage in limited diplomatic representation,
restricted to places they believe their major external interests to lie,
and emphasizing geographical and functional areas (Wiberg 1987).
If size-based resource constraints act to limit Pacific Island nation-
states internationalism, then it is also true that their isolation from
the main centers of international relations has led them into policies
of cultivating external ties to counteract geographic distance.
The political conditions in the decade after the First World War
are said to have favoured both the security of small states and their
opportunity to play constructive roles in Euro-centered world politics
(Fox 1969:751-764). A study of small state behavior in the League
of Nations had already noted that the commonality of their interests
as small states was insufficiently strong to sustain coalescent
behavior in the organization (Rappard 1934:544-575). Another
study noted that small states were no less prone to behave selfishly
and irresponsibly as members of international organizations than
great powers (Liska 1957). An analysis of the Pacific-Island nation-
states behavior at the United Nations would show that political
alignment was a better predictor of the Pacific Island nation-states
policy in the organization than size. Indeed one's impression is that
political alignments provide a more reliable explanation of United
Nations behavior of nations in general than their size; that is, there is
more likely to be a measurable degree of cohesion within Western,
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Eastern, and nonaligned groupings, or North/South countries, rather
than in major, medium and small power clusters.
Small, middle and large powers are said to differ in the use they
make of international organizations as instruments of interest
aggregation and legitimization (Karns & Mingst 1987:454-474).
Lacking the resources to engage in punishment and reward behavior,
they fall back upon the tools of protest, persuasion, and recognition
(Boyce 1977). As standing multilateral conferences, international
organizations offer Pacific Island nation-states forums in which to
maximize their international influence \vithout having to expend
scarce resources on traditional bilateral diplomacy with every
independent actor in world affairs. Small states are traditionally
regarded as being strong supporters of international law and
international organizations, which are seen as their best safeguard for
long-term security. Economic international organizations are crucial
centers of action and decision-making in the interdependent system;
the United Nations is the crucial organization for generating
international norms, and the sole 'authoritative legitimator' of world
order (Hermann 1987).
International organizations provide the framework within which
small states can build coalitions and pursue collective bargaining. This
is particularly important in issues on which there is stiff opposition
from one or more major powers, as happened with the Law of the Sea
(Mizukami 1991:111-121). The United Nations framework was
indispensable for the Pacific Island nation-states in the negotiation
and conclusion of this regime, which lends further plausibility to the
claim that a coalition of the weak can have some influence over 'non-
hegemonic regime-creation', if that coalition maintains sufficient unity
and if it follows an appropriate bargaining strategy (Rothstein
1984:326).
Major powers have the greatest capacity to disturb international
order. They have the greatest capacity to disturb that order as well as
to defend it against challenges from the territorial, political and
economic revisionists; and the greatest to lose if the defense fails. One
of the reasons for the power of veto of the permanent members in the
United Nations Security Council was that the major powers would bear
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the brunt of the military burden of international enforcement of the
collective peace by the United Nations. In practice, with peacekeeping
the characteristic United Nations operation, the military burden has
fallen typically on all states but the major powers. Fears that
superpower involvement in local conflicts would exacerbate instead of
ameliorating crises were amply borne out by the Multinational Force
in both Beirut and the Gulf War. Contingents from non-great powers
are less likely to fuel suspicions of furthering national objectives
antithetical to international duties and ensure an easier chain of
authority from the United Nations commander, \I/hile permitting the
smaller members of the international community to play a role in the
maintenance of world peace (Jensen 1982:223). Fiji is a frequent
contributor to international peacekeeping and Papua New Guinea has
proposed becoming involved in peacekeeping in Cambodia.
Small states often cling to the hope that the United Nations can
make an indirect contribution to their security by providing at least
minimal or occasional protection against the illegitimate claims of
predatory powers. The United Nations can also provide a 'global
bridge' across which the governments of small states involved in
disputes with major powers can retire to safety, and a 'lightening rod'
for deflecting and burying the more violent political reactions at home
to concessions abroad at the altar of power realities (Indorf 1986).
Mediation in international disputes is a recourse of the lessor rather
than the bigger powers (Jenson 1982:223).
Smaller states face a peculiar dilemma in international
organizations between the competing pulls of efficacy and equality. To
be effective, an international organization like the United Nations
would need to abandon the consensual approach in the plural General
Assembly for a centralization of authority in the Security Council as its
executive organ. But the Assembly more than the Council is the organ
of lesser powers. The dilemma confronted the small states during
negotiations to set up the United Nations, when 'lesser states were
never sure whether they should be more frightened of great power
solidarity or of great power conflict' (Claude 1964:56).
Some international economic institutions have voting weights
correlated more precisely to size than do their political counterparts.
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Small states have little influence over, and therefore also little
responsibility for the viability of the international economic system.
They are passive if not exploited participants in the regulation of the
international economic system. This has been brought home most
forcefully to Pacific Islanders with the repeated threats of agricultural
warfare between the United State and the European Community,
which would cause measurable-to-substantial damage to the main
antagonists but could prove fatal for the bystanders. In the political
organs of international organizations, small states like the Pacific
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creation. In international economic exchanges, however, they are
'price-takers' with marginal influence on the rules which regulate
international commerce.
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Small State Influence on Larger States?
The relationship between power and influence finds little
agreement among scholars (Sullivan 1990, Franck 1990). It is also a
truism of our times that the possession of power is a lot easier than
its exercise. The power to compel is rather different from the power
to deter. Power is pervasive, ubiquitous, multidimensional. It is also
elusive, relational, perceptual, and issue-specific (Stoll & Ward 1989).
Thus on the nuclear issue, regardless of smaller size -- indeed to
some extent helped by small size -- the Pacific Island nation-states
have been (i) virtually immu~{o threats from the United States; (ii)
in a position to influence AU~lia and New Zealand more than be
pressured by those governments; (iii) able to make some impact on
the nuclear proliferation potential throughout the Pacific; and (iv)
and able to exercise a measure of influence internationally
completely out of proportion to its military and economic resources.
Innovation is held to be the key to the prosperity and survival
of most private firms. Similarly, innovation may hold the key to
continued survival of nations. Ideas are not rank-dependent:
isolated and exceptionally secure states like Pacific Islands may in
fact be better able to break free of historical cobwebs in
reconceptualizing security concerns and survival strategies. Major
powers in any international system are foremost status quo actors,
for the existing order perpetuates their privileged positions of
inequality (Clark 1989). The distinctive thing about the modern
states-system is that smaller states too have been drawn into the
ranks of the status quo powers because the present world order
preserves the fiction of legal equality.
Major power-small states inequalities however is fact. The
Pacific Island nation-states are unlikely to ever exercise decisive
influence over the policies of the great powers. Instead, they can at
best hope to shape the environment in which great power policies
are pursued through both quiet and public diplomacy.
For adherents of the school of quiet diplomacy, a small Western
ally can make a dual contribution towards easing world tensions. It
can try to explain and justify United States policy to others, and it
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can simultaneously try to exercise a moderating influence upon
United States leaders. But in order to do the latter, it is necessary to
retain the friendship of the major Western powers, and to make sure
that advice IS tendered in a restrained, responsible and constructive
manner. It is difficult for any government, let alone that of a
superpower, to be seen to change its policy in response to public
pressure from a foreign government. Smaller allies can urge military
caution and diplomatic flexibility.
Engagement in an interdependent world offers opportunities
for influence and leadership to states like the Pacific Islands in
shaping world order as exemplified by their lead in bringing
attention to the effects of global warming. Influence may be
described as the ability to affect the behavior of an external actor
without resort to superior military or economic strength. In order to
achieve success in exercising influence, a state requires 'an outward-
looking orientation, cross-cultural empathy, diplomatic skill,
congruence between verbal projection and actual conduct' (Knorr
1975: 316). As the great powers' role in nurturing and sustaining
world order has subverted by nuclear weapons acquisitive behavior
to become grossly irresponsible (Bull 1980:437-447), the lesser
powers searched for ways and means of directing the superpowers
back to the path of responsibility.
The bargaining position of small states vis-a-vis large states is
not necessarily unfavorable. Major powers have global interests and
are required to process a number of foreign policy issues
concurrently. Smaller states can afford to concentrate their energies
on a single issue, which may be of fundamental importance to them
but relatively unimportant to larger states with crowded foreign
policy agendas. The smaller state may be prepared to play for
correspondingly higher stakes, whereas the larger state would be
proportionately risk-averse on a less significant issue. A weak state
near destitution can playoff the fears of larger states of a power
vacuum consequent upon collapse, and windows of opportunity
presented to actual or potential adversaries for filling the vacuum
(Miller 1986: 70-93).
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The smaller state can also benefit from a more cohesive and
centralized foreign policy bureaucracy and exploit the larger size and
pluralistic fragmentation of such complex decision-making structures
as that of the United States or Australia: military and economic
strengths of size become diplomatic liabilities, and constraints
become assets. Smaller states can sometimes have higher tolerance
level for sacrifices deemed necessary to achieve national goals.
Smaller states can mobilize public opinion more readily against
appearance of pressure from the larger state, or to enable them to
highly politicized in their home constituencies; or else public opinion
in the smaller states can box a government into greater rigidity than
the officials might wish (Alagappa 1987:15-31).
Yet on military issues the bargaining position of the smaller states
is decidedly weaker. It lacks the resources and facilities of the major
power to collect, collate, store and retrieve military assessments; on
issues of national security, the major power is more likely to be
determined on its own course of action, and irritated at obstructionist
smaller states (Spiegel 1971 :375-96; Nye 1974:961-96). More subtly,
regular and special intelligence briefing by the larger states can help to
mould the world-views of smaller allies towards conformity with the
international images dominant in the larger state's policy-making
hierarchy. But in a conflict situation, the equation is again different
(Mack 1975: 175-200). The conflict can be total and hence unifying for
the smaller state, but marginal and domestically divisive for the
intervening great power.
In relations with the South Pacific, Australia, New Zealand and the
US are the potentially coercive powers. They instituted selective and
limited sanctions as a mark of disapproval of military rule in Fiji in
1987 (Wood 1989:31-34). But in this relationship all the limitations of
sanctions as an instrument of coercive statecraft -- impossibility of
securing universal, comprehensive, and mandatory sanctions; ready
availability of alternative sellers; profits of evading sanctions exceeding
gains of policing them; economic damage to sanctions-imposing
countries and to innocent parties in target countries -- offset the impact
of limited and half-hearted measures applied against post-coup Fiji by
So small states are not
larger powers with whom
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Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
always vulnerable to economic pressure from
most of their relations take place.
Regional cooperation is frequently cited as one possible solution to
the 'problem' of smallness, leading to the creation of common markets,
sharing of specialized services and the deployment of collective
bargaining power (Neemia 1986). The South Pacific Forum was set up
in 1971 as the symbol and instrument of regional decision-making.
Australia and New Zealand were invited to join in recognition of their
In a political and institutional sense, relationships in the South Pacific
Forum are those of equals.
The South Pacific Forum is seen as providing its member-states
a 'regional voice' by creating the institutional mechanisms and
diplomatic weight required to derive bargaining advantages against
outside actors. (Pacific Island nation-state elite also view good
regionalism as good domestic politics. Attendance at annual Forum
gatherings affords them an image of statesmanship that enhances
their political standing at home.) Most importantly, the assertion of
indigenous Pacific values and control over various aspects of the
regional security agenda can be regarded as an important symbol of
the Pacific Islanders overall determination to build greater autonomy
and self-determination against competing interests of outside powers
(Stephenson 1990:110-114)
Pacific Islanders are not essentially caught in a tide of events
not of their own making -- "unable to get far ahead of waves caused
by larger actors in world affairs, to stand still in the current of
events, or to resist the undertow (Fry 1991 :394-400)." Nor are they
small inhabitants of a 'quiet backwater', with the tide of global
development passing them by. Pacific Islanders are developing the
means by which, and the commitment with which to monitor and to
influence global events, while at the same time connecting global
issues and major international actorc'
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CONCLUSION
Size, it has been argued, is "an important factor underlying
variations in the international behavior of nation-states; small states
as a class tend to differ from large states in their foreign policy
behavior (East 1973:556)." By contrast, I have attempted to show
the limitations of past small state theory by means of a critical
review of the literature, and an empirical demonstration of how
'small' as an independent variable fails to account especially for the
security, economic, and political dimensions of Pacific Island nation=
states foreign policies. C"/"'
More than two decades ago, (I'nternational RYlations analysts
rarely explicated internal and external factors as casual agents, let
alone weight them or specify the relationship between them
(Rosenau 1966:27-92). In the absence of general theories, foreign
policy analyses had remained largely historical and single-country
oriented. Theories of foreign policy would hypothesize the manner
in which the various internal and external factors combined under
different, but specified, circumstances; and operationalize the
hypotheses with a view to testing them in order that they could be
confirmed or refuted as valid generalizations.
Unfortunately, as we have seen, at times such hypotheses
between state size and foreign policy behavior contradict one
another. For example: about small states being risk-prone or risk-
averse; about small size and geographical isolation--the 'tyranny of ~
distance' -- being a factor promoting or inhibiting alignment; about
alliance umbrellas maximizing independence of action by solving the
security dilemma, or maximizing dependency and constricting
freedom of action through strategically irrelevant entanglements; of
tension in a binuclear system leading to coercive assertions of bloc
leaders' authority to constrict small state freedom, or safeguarding
small state security through mutual deterrence and prevention of
superpower condominium.
Insofar as small states at least are concerned, International
Relations remains 'pre-theoretic' (Ferguson & Mansbach 1988), first,
because of the elusiveness of the concept of the small state; second,
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because of the lack of studies of the relationship between the
independent variable of small size and the dependent variable of
small state foreign policy behavior; third, because of the lack of
cumulation in the studies of the international behavior of small
states; and fourth, because of the lack of incorporation of the size
factor into a dynamic theoretical model which integrates different
explanatory variables with precise weighting and specified
relationships.
Let us assume that a-z represents the entire range of state
behavior in international relations. Three different levels of
propositions can be postulated about small state behavior:
1. if, and only if, the actor is a small state, then behavior patterns a-I:
2. if small state, then behavior a-i; or
3. behavior a-i only if small state.
For the first proposition to be valid, every small state would
exhibit the a-i range of behavior; all small state behavior would be
within this range; and no state other than a small one would act
within this range. We could then predict particular behavior from
known size, or infer actor size from observed behavior.
The second proposition would mean that a small state's
behavior was limited to the a-i range, but other classes of states
could also engage in that behavior. If we knew the class of state, we
could predict its behavior; but observing by itself would not permit
any inference about the size of an actor. Contrariwise, the third type
of proposition would mean that the a-i range of behavior was
exhibited only by small states, but that small states were not limited
to that range. Consequently, observed behavior would enable
inferences to be drawn about actor size; but knowledge of the size of
the state would not of itself allow us to predict its behavior.
Diluting our theoretical claim still further, we could shift from
small state determinism to small state probabilism and postulate that
most small states acted within the behavior range a-i most of the
time. While this would be difficult to operationalize in a falsifiable
form (so that just one contrary instance disproves the proposition), it
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could at least be shown to be a statistical generalization. It would be
theoretically messy, and would permit no application to individual
states with any degree of confidence with regard to either size or
behavior.
Yet the above survey shows even this anemic theory of small
state behavior to be shaky. The best that we seem to be able to
manage is small state possibilism: some small states behave in
quasi-characteristic manner under certain conditions. Not all small
states act in this way under these these conditions; not most small
states act in this U'~H' nnrlPT thp~p t'ronrlltlron~· nrot pupn ronp ~rn~1l......J W."~""''''' .... .I. ...... u...... ......"" ...... ""' ..... _ .... u, .1..1._" _..,. _&.1. _ •• _ LI.&••_.&..&.
state will always act in the same way under the same conditions.
Structuralism has difficulty coping with difference and diversity; a
single theory of small state behavior would require uniform
behavioral responses to identical structural demands. The
theoretical difficulties with size differentiated foreign policy
behavior thus reflect that "in recent years the quest in international
relations has become, if anything, increasingly elusive (Ferguson &
Mansbach 1988:213)." It is possible to generalize cautiously about
foreign policy characteristics of smaller states in multilateral
alliances and organizations or asymmetric dyads, for example in
regard to bargaining assets and outcomes; it is fallacious to
extrapolate from these to a small state syndrome in foreign policy 10
general.
The insufficiency of the small state concept as an analytic tool
is indicated also in respect of the obsession with small state viability:
"the smaller the state the less viable it is (Vital 1969:3)." In the
present international system, survival is not a problem for most
South Pacific nation-states. With the security of a state not
challenged, theories originating in the security dilemma cannot
explain that state's behavior. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
focus of viability-oriented studies of small states shifted to island
states: so viability was a problem in search of a root rather than a
small state phenomenon. Yet the empirical record of the postwar era
suggests that viability may be a big state problem. States artificially
large because of historical accidents have struggled to maintain
territorial integrity against assertions of sub-national identities. That
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IS, if the modern state faces more acute external threats because it is
small, it also faces more acute internal threats because it is too large.
And the world has become interdependent in such a way that the
security and survival of nations anywhere have become hostage to
policies and practices everywhere (Walker 1990).
Security has also begun to be conceptualized in increasingly
broader terms, with subjects as ecological degradation, human rights
abuses and the greenhouse effect beginning to intrude upon the
consciousness of national security leaderships. Traditional larger
states are not immune to the effects of extra-national forces in such
non-military areas. Can the "delimitation of political space as
discrete territorialities be regarded as adequate when the in-
group/out-group dichotomies that they represent no longer describe
the reality of international exchange? ( Dalby 1991)" And if the
states-system is itself going to be challenged, then investigating the
logic of small state behavior in that system may become a somewhat
irrelevant pursuit.
For all these reasons, it does not seem promising to take the
concept of the small state as the departure for studying Pacific Island
nation-states international relations. Many study the foreign policy
of small states by attempting to investigate what modes and
techniques of diplomacy best enable a small state to achieve its
national objectives? But if they were to look closely at Pacific Island
nation-states foreign policy experience, what would emerge is how
important have been the personality and assumptions of any
countries chief decision-maker of any given time.
This is not say that size can serve no explanatory purpose at
all. Rather, the importance of size as an isolated explanatory factor
should not be exaggerated: small countries are a heterogeneous
group which do not have uniform behavioral characteristics and
cannot be expected to respond in the same way to similar stimuli.
The balance between structural and volitional components in
explaining foreign policy behavior may well be different for large
powers and small states, but it is unlikely that the same matrix will
found to be operative for all small states. As a corollary, where the
non-major powers react in different ways to similar external
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conditions, for example, Vanuatu and Tonga nuclear policies -- or
where incommensurate powers react in similar ways to different
external conditions, for example Swiss and United States (19th
century) policy of neutrality -- explanations must be sought beyond
the variable of size, by incorporating such other factors across
different levels of analysis as personality characteristics of individual
decision-makers, internal political structures, geopolitical
environments, and issue sensitivity. In short, small state theory is
incompatible with Pacific Island nation-states reality: an adequate
explanation of Pacific Island nation-states foreign policy and security





Alagappa, Muthiah, ed. National Security for Developing States.
Dover: Auburn House Pub. Co., 1987.
Alford, Jonathon. "Security dilemmas of small states," in The World
Today. Aug-Sep 1984.
Amstrup, N. "The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of
Research Efforts." Cooperation and Conflict 11 1976.
Boyce, P.J. Foreign Affairs for New States: Some Questions of
Credentials. New York; St. Martin's Press, 1977.
Boyce, P. J. and Herr, R. A. "Microstate Diplomacy in the South
Pacfic." Australian Outlook. Canberra: Australian Institute of
International Affairs, 1974.
Bull, Hedley. Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan, 1977.
Chaudhary, Mustafa. 'Dynamics of Super-Power -- Small Power
Realtionship,' In Hasnet Syed, ed., Security for Weak Nations.
Lahore: Izharsons, 1987.
Cicin, Biliana, & Robert Knecht. The Emergence of a Regional Ocean
Regime in the South Pacific. Honolulu: Environment and Policy
Institute, East-West Center, Working Paper No. 14, 1989.
Clark, Ian. The Hierarchy of States. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989.
Claude, L. L. Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of
International Organizations. New York: Random House, 1964.
40-Bissonette
Cohen, Saul B. "The World Geopolitical System in Retrospect and
Prospect," in Journal of Geography, 1990.
Connell, John. Sovereignty & Survival: Island Microstates In the
Third World (Sydney, Australia: Department of Geography,
1988), Research Monograph No.3, ISBN 0 909764147.
'Island Microstates: The Mirage of Devlopment,' in The
Contemporary Pacific. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,




Rethinking Security: Ambiguities In Policy and
Simon Fraser University: Centre for International
1991.
____ "A Climate of Conflict?: Environment and Security in the
Pacific," in Douglas A. Ross and John Lamb, eds., Canadian
Security Policy in the Pacific to the Year 2010. Ottawa: Centre
for Arms Control, 1991
Demas, W. G. The Economies of Development in Small Economies.
Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965.
Diggines, C. E. "The Problems of Small States," in The Round Table.
London: Butterworth, 1985.
Dihm, William. 'Global Change and the South Pacific Forum States,' In
David Hegarty and Peter Polomka, eds., Vol. 1, The Security of
Oceania in the 1990's: Views from the region. Canberra,
Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1989, Canberra
Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 60.
Dommen, Edward and Philippe Hein (eds.). States, Microstates and
Islands. Croom Helm, Sydney, 1985.
41-Bissonette
East, M. A. "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior," in World Politics. Vol.
23, 1973.
Espindola, R. "Security Dilemmas." In Politics, Security and
Development in Small States, eds. C. Clarke and T. Payne, 73.
London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.
Fairbairn, Te'o I. J. Isalnd Economies: Studies from the South Pacific.
Suva: USP, 1985.
Ferguson, Yale and Mansbach, Richard. The Elusive Quest: Theory
and International Politics. South Carolina: University of South
Carolina Press, 1988.
Firth, Stuart. "Sovereignty and Independence in the Contemporary
Pacific," The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 1, Nos. 1 & 2, Spring &
Fall 1989.
Fox, A.B. The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
Fry, Greg. 'The Region in Review: International Issues and Events,
1990,' in The Contemporary Pacific. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, Vol.3, No.2, 1991.
Gilpin, R. War and Change in World Politics. London: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
Gray, Colin. The Geopolitics of Superpower. Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1988.
Hamel-Green. "Regional Arms Control in the South Pacific: Island
State Responses to Australia's Nuclear Free Zone Initiative," In
The Contemporary Pacific. Vol. 3, No.1, 1991.
42-Bissonette
Handel, Michael. Weak States m the International System. London:
Frank Cass, 1981.
Harden, Sheila, ed. Small is Dangerous: Micro States in a Macro
World. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
Hegarty, David. Small State Security in the South Pacific.
Australia: Strategic Defence Studies Centre, Working
126, ISBN 0 7315 0096 2, 1987.
Canberra,
Paper
___. Papua New Guinea: At the Political Crossroads? Canberra,
Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper
No. 177, 1989.
Henningham, Stephen. "Keeping the Tricolor Flying: The French
Pacific into the 1990's," in The Contemporary Pacific, Vol. 1,
Nos. 1 & 2, Spring & Fall 1989.
Henderson, J. The Foreign Policy of a Small State. Edited by J.
Henderson, K. Jackson, and R. Kennaway, Beyond New Zealand:
the Foreign Policy of a Small State. Auckland, New Zealand:
Methuen, 1980.
_____. (Rapporteur). "The Security of Small States: Report of a
Study Group of the Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association. "The Parliamentarian 55 (1984).
Hermann, C. F. and Kegley, C. W. (eds.). New Directions in the Study
of Foreign Policy. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987.
Herr, Richard A. "Microstate Sovereignty in the South Pacific: Is
Small Practical?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 10 (2)
September 1988.
'Diplomacy and Security m the South Pacific,'
Affairs Bulletin. Vol. 64, 1987.
m Current
43-Bissonette
Hoffman, Stanley. The Politics Ethics of International Relations. New
York: Carnegie, 1988.
Holl, 0. Small States in Europe and Dependence. Laxenburg:
Austrian Institute of International Affairs, 1983.
Holsti, KJ. The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in
International Theory. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985.
House of Commons. Second Report from the Foreign Affairs
Committee; Grenada- HMSO, March 1984.
Indorf, Hans. Strategies for Small State Survival. Kuala Lumpur:
ISIS, 1985.
I.L.M. Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States,
done at Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea, April 2, 1987;
reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1048, 1987.
____ Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and
Environment of the South Pacific Region, done at Noumea, New
Caledonia, November 25, 1986; reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 38, 1987.
Jackson, R.H. and C.G. Rosberg. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist:
The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood." World Politics
35 1982.
Jensen, L. Explaining Foreign Policy. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1982.
Kakazu, Hiroshi. Trade and Development of Small Island Economies
with Particular Emphasis on the South Pacific. Japan: UN
Centre for Regional Development, February, 1986.
44-Bissonette
King, Peter. 'Redefining South Pacific Security,' III Ramesh Thakur,
ed., The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects.
University of Otago: Macmillan, 1991.
Kirby, Andrew and M.D. Ward. Space, spatiality, geography,
territoriality, context, locale -- and conflict. Roundtable
working paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1987.
Kiste, Robert and Richard Herr. The Potential for Soviet Penetration
of the South Pacific Islands: An Assessment,' study prepared
for the State Department of the U. S. December, 1984.
Karns, J. K. and K. A. Mingst. "International Organizations and
Foreign Policy," in C. F. Hermann, New Directions in the Study
of Foreign Policy. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987.
Kratochwil, Friederick. "The Challenge of Security in a Changing
World." Journal of International Affairs 43 (1), Summer/Fall
1989.
Liska, G. International Equilibrium. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1957.
Lowenthal, D. "Security Dilemmas." In Politics, Security and
Development in Small States, eds. C. Clarke and T. Payne.
London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.
Lloyd, P. J. International Trade Problems of Small Nations. Durham,
North Carolina: Duke University Press,1968.
Machiavelli, N. The Prince. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1985.
Mack, Andrew. "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of
Asymmetric Conflict," in World Politics. Vol. 27, 1975.
45-Bissonette
Maniruzzaman, T. The Security of Small States in the Third World.
Canberra: Australian National University, 1982.
Miller, J. D. B. 'Sovereignty as a Source of Vitality for the State,' In
Review of International Studies. Vol. 12, No.2, 1986.
Mizukami, Chiyuki. 'Fisheries Problems in the South Pacific Region,'
in Marine Policy. Vol. 11, March, 1991.
Mohsin, Amena. "Regionalism and Security in the South Pacific,' in
Abdul Hafiz, ed., Security of Small States. Dhaka: University
Press, 1987.
Morse, E.L. Modernization and Transformation of International
Relations. New York: Free Press, 1976.
Mulhall, D. "The Foreign Policy Leanings Of Small Powers," in New
Zealand International Review. Vol. 11 , 1986.
Neemia, Uentabo. Cooperation and Conflict. Fiji: University of the
South Pacific, 1986.
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs. South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty, done at Rarotonga, August 6, 1985: New Zealand
Treaty Series 1986, No.7, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Nicholson, Michael. Formal Theories in International Relations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Nye, Joseph. "Transnational Relations and Interstate Conflicts," In
International Organization. Vol. 28, 1974.
"Understanding U.S. Strength," in Foreign Policy. Vol. 72, 1988
46-Bissonette
Pepper, D. The Geography of Peace and War. Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1985.
Quester, George. "Trouble III the Islands: Defending the Micro-States."
International Security 8 (2), Fall 1983.
Rajan, M.S. "Small States and the Sovereign Nation-State System."
International Studies 14 1988.
Rappard, W.E. "Small States in the League of Nations," in Political
Science Quaterly. Vol. 49, 1934.
Robertson, Robert & Akosita Tamanisau. Fiji -- Shattered Coups.
Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988.
Rothstein, R.L. The Weak in the World of the Strong. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977.
____. "Regime Creation by a Coalition of the Weak," in
International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 28 1984.
Rosenau, J.N. Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy. Edited by
R. Barry Farrell, Approaches to Comparative and International
Politics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
Rummell, R. J. National Attributes and Behavior. Beverly Hills: Sage,
1979.
Russett, Bruce. "America's Continuing Strengths," in International
Organization. Vol. 39,1985.
Saffu, Yaw. 'Changing Civil-Military Relations III Fiji', III Australian
Outlook, 1989.
Sanday, R.T. 'The End of the Cold War in the Pacific?' Asia-Pacific
Defense Reporter, 1991.
47-Bissonette
Selwyn, P. Development Policy in Small Countries. London: Croom
Helm, 1975.
Siaguru, Tony. 'Small's' Security for Small Island States,' in David
Hegarty and Peter Polomka, eds., Vol. 1, The Security of
Oceania in the 1990's: Views from the region. Canberra,
Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1989, Canberra
Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 60.
. 'The U. S. Dilemma,' in Dennis Bark, ed., The Red Orchestra:
The Case of the Southwest Pacific. Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1989.
Sloan, G.R. Geopolitics in U.S. Policy. New York: St. Martin, 1988.
Spiegel, S.L. Conflict in World Politics. Cambridge: Winthrop, 1971.
Stein, Arthur. Why Nations Cooperate. New York: Cornell University
Press, 1990.
Stephenson, Carolyn. 'Alternative Paths to Security in the Pacific' m
Proceedings of the Pacific Security Symposium. Wellington:
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 17-19 May
1990.
Stoll, Richard & Michael Ward. Power in Politics. Boulder & London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.




Sullivan, Michael. Power in Contemporary International Politics.
Columbia, SC: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1990.
48-Bissonette
Sutherland, William M. Size, Security and Pacific Geopolitics: A
Critique of the Kiste & Herr Report. University of the South
Pacific School and Economic Development Working Paper No.5,
1988.
Thakur, Ramesh. "Non-Intervention in International Relations," In
Political Science Vol. 42, No.1, July 1990.
"The Treaty of Rarotnga: The South Pacific Nuclear-Free
Zone," in D. Pitt and G. Thompson, eds., Nuclear Free Zones.
London, 1987.
"Defence Reviews In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,"
In International Journal. Vol. 42, 1987.
Tanham, G. K. & Eleanor Wainstein. Security Trends in the South
Pacific. Santa Monica CA: A RAND Note, N-2728-USDP, 1988.
Tow, William. "Geostrategy in the Asian-Pacific
Lamy, Contemporary International Issue.
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.
Region," in Steven L.
Boulder &London:
Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World.
Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990.
Vital, D. The Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in
International Relations. Oxford: Clarendon, 1967.
The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power-Great
Power Conflict. London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
Vogel, H. "Small States' Efforts in International Relations:Enlarging
the Scope," In Small States in Europe and Dependence, ed. O.
Hoell, 54-68. Laxenburg: Austrian Institute for International
Affairs, 1983.
49-Bissonette
Walker, R.BJ. One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World
Peace. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1988.
Walt, S.M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithica: Cornell University Press,
1987.
Ward, M. "Dependent Development -- Problems of Economic
Planning in Small Developing Countries," in P. Sewlyn, ed.,
Development Policy in Small Countries. London: Croom Helm,
1975
Wiberg, H. "The Security of Small Nations: Challenges and Defenses,"
in Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 24, 1987.
Wilkenfeld, J. Crisis in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Pergamon,
1988.
Wolfers, A. Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins
University Press, 1982.
Wood, G.A. "Paradise Regained or Paradise Defiled? Fiji under
Military Rule," in International Studies. Vol. 26, 1989.
Worsley, P & P. Kitromilides (eds). Small States in the Modern World.
Nicosia: New Cypress Association, 1979.
Zolberg, Aristide. 'The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States
of Tropical Africa', American Political Science Review. Vol.
LXII, No.1, 1965.
Sources Consulted
Ashley, Richard. "The geopolitics of geopolitical space: toward a
critical social theory of international politics. Alternatives 12
(4), 1987.
50-Bissonette
Blacker, Pete., "Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society."




People, States, and Fear: The National Security
in International Relations. Brighton, U.K.: Wheatsheaf,
Dalby, Simon. "The Soviet Union as Other," in Political Geography
Quarterly, London: Butterworth & Co., 1990.
____ "American security discourse: the persistence of geopolitics,"
III Political Geography Quarterly, London: Butterworth & Co.,
1990.
Der Derian, James and Michael Shapiro. International/Intertextual
Relations. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989.
Falk, Richard A. Regional Politics and World Order. San Francisco:
W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973.
___ The Promise of World Order. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1987.
Fanck, Thomas. The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990.
Gurtov, Mel. Global Politics in the Human Interest. Boulder: Lynn
Reinner, 1988.
Keohane, Robert. Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1986.
Mansbach, Richard. In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981.
51-Bissonette
Merrit, Richard. Power in World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1990.
Mendlovitz, Saul H. and R.B.J. Walker, (eds.). Towards a Just World
Peace. London: Butterworths, 1987.
Contending Sovereignties: Redifining Political
Communtiy. Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1990.
Miller, Lynn. Global Order. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
Dye, Kenneth A. ed. Co-operation Under Anarchy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986.
Plischke, Elmer. Microstates in World Affairs. Washington, D.C.: AEI,
1977
Ross, Ken. Prospects for Crisis Prediction: A South Pacific Case Study.
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, RSPS, 1990.
Sakamoto, Yoshikazu. ed. Strategic Doctrines and Their Alternatives.
New York; Gordon and Breach, 1987.
Schumacher, E. F. Small is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if
People Mattered. New York: Harper and Row,1973
Smith, Dan and E.P. Thompson, (eds.). Prospects for a Habitable
Planet. London: Penguin, 1987.
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Relations. Reading:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979.
Wight, Martin. Why is there no International Theory? Edited by
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight. Diplomatic
Investigations. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966.
